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Point: In the Russian historical political 
tradition in conducting reforms under the 
inertia and passivity of the broad masses, 
the subjective factor plays an important role. 
Under these conditions, the leading position 
belongs to the role of a public leader. The 
fact is particularly relevant to Russia with its 
centuries-old monarchist, fuehrer historical 
traditions. In the early twenty-first century, such 
a leader by a lucky chance for Russia became 
V.V. Putin. Was appearance of Vladimir Putin 
as head of state a random occurrence? It was 
random to a large extent. And at the same time, 
it was natural. After ten years of destruction 
of the country in the 1990s, the emergence 
of a creative statesman, which was Vladimir 
Putin for Russia, was ripe. Here was a clear 
dialectic of the necessary and the accidental in 
a historical process.
The political component of the reform 
process is extremely urgent. The success of 
social and economic changes depends largely on 
the openness of the political system, maximum 
freedom of speech and other political freedoms, 
strict compliance with state laws and human 
rights. The more the political sphere is close to 
the democratic ideal, the more favorable are the 
conditions for successful economic and social 
transformation.
Example: In the political sphere, same as in 
the economy, a substantial burden of unresolved 
issues accumulated during the 1990s. As a 
result of spontaneous, often not thoughtful and 
hasty decisions Russia appeared on the verge 
of collapse as a sovereign state formation. The 
most important strategic task of the new state 
leadership was to preserve the unity of the 
country. To achieve this, it was necessary to 
– 1058 –
Alexey E. Prokopovich and Oleg Yu. Lyutykh. Political Reforms in Russia and Improvement of Political System in Russia…
build a strong public authority, to strengthen its 
structure from top to bottom.
The priorities of the new leadership in the 
political sphere were to strengthen the vertical 
of state power through a series of fundamental 
political decisions: seven federal districts 
were formed to enhance direct contacts of the 
supreme power with the regions. Presidential 
plenipotentiaries appointed to the districts began 
to exercise functions of political intermediaries 
between the supreme executive power and 
local authorities in the regions. Boundaries of 
federal districts coincided with the boundaries 
of military districts, and prominent political and 
military figures were appointed to head each of 
them. Five of the seven presidential envoys had 
military ranks of generals (G. Poltavchenko, 
V. Cherkesov, P. Latyshev, K. Pulikovsky, and 
V. Kazantsev). Thus the President demonstrated 
the seriousness of his intentions to strengthen 
order in the country, to prevent the trends of 
collapse and chaos.
Another important measure to strengthen the 
state was reorganization of the Federation Council, 
the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly. 
Previously, its members were representatives of 
regional political elite from the structures of the 
legislative and executive authorities. Emphasis 
was placed on their work in the field, in the regions, 
as the work in the Federation Council distracted 
regional leaders from everyday practical work 
with people in the community. In their place, rank 
and file representatives of local legislative and 
executive authorities were nominated (although, 
on presentation of executive and legislative 
structures of the regional government). Thus 
the President reduced possible influence of the 
regional leaders on the political processes in the 
center; put their work under tight control of the 
central executive power.
A kind of compromise between central and 
regional structures became the creation of the 
the State Council, an advisory body with unclear 
political functions. It was assumed that the State 
Council in Russia should give recommendations 
on the development of new laws. As is known, 
the State Council was established for the first 
time in 1810 by Emperor Alexander I, when the 
State Council also had no real power functions. 
The State Council of 2000 was meeting not more 
than once in three months. In the period between 
the sessions, the presidium of seven governors 
was meeting, whose composition was constantly 
changing.
Changes in the structures of the highest 
legislative power were designed, first, to increase 
the personal authority of President Vladimir 
Putin as a determined, principled, consistent 
politician who had the strategic initiative to 
reform higher state bodies, and secondly, to put 
regional leaders under control, many of which, 
in the situation of lack of proper control by the 
central government in the previous years, had lost 
the sense of responsibility not only to voters, but 
also to the Kremlin. Some of them were explicitly 
stated in their real place in the political system of 
the state authority.
Measures to bring regional legislation 
into line with the Constitution and federal 
laws served for strengthening of the state in 
the country. It’s no secret that in the 1990s, 
many regions of Russia, especially the national 
republics defending the centrifugal tendencies 
adopted their own laws that were contradicting 
with the federal laws. This fact destabilized the 
political situation in regions, encouraged ethnic 
separatism, threatened the existence of a single 
state space and the territorial integrity of the 
country. Through the efforts of the center it 
became possible to reverse this negative trend 
and weaken the political position of a number 
of regional leaders seeking to use the lack of 
control by the center in their own short-term 
interests using the Yeltsin’s ill-conceived thesis 
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in early1990s – “take sovereignty as much as 
you can”.
During Vladimir Putin’s presidency, in 
connection with the continuation of market 
reforms and the overall disappointing results 
of the socio-economic development in 2000, a 
model of managed democracy began to develop. 
Its content was determined by the authors of the 
scientific collected articles “Competitiveness 
and Modernization of the Economy” as “a 
formal observance of democratic norms under 
the actual tyranny of power.” (Competitiveness 
and economy modernization, 2004. – P.35) 
The power found its justification in the drive 
for strengthening the state’s role in the society, 
overcoming its weakness, improvement of public 
activism through state mechanisms. However, in 
the system of managed democracy the society 
loses the ability to control activities of the 
government.
In practice, overcoming the weakness of 
the state turned out with restrictions on freedom 
of speech, increasing use of the so-called 
administrative resource in election campaigns, 
the abolition of gubernatorial election, the 
onset of the socio-economic rights of workers 
(monetization of benefits, increasing payment of 
utility bills, etc.). At the same time, the political 
powers of the presidency expanded steadily, 
strengthening the power vertical. In the official 
literature, this phenomenon was called “managed 
democracy.”
The model of managed state (democracy) 
appeared in connection with the subject’s inability 
to organize management of the community under 
the conditions of deepening democratic principles 
and norms. Historically, Russia has not developed 
a model of social functioning of subsystems in 
democracy, which in the 1990s was reduced to 
formal, external features. The authoritarian 
tendencies of the new government narrowed the 
format of democracy even more leaving the latter 
in the form of individual elements, especially 
after the tragic events in Beslan in September 
2004.
We understand this situation not as absolute 
immunity of Russia to democracy, but as a lack 
of adequate social experience of functioning of 
a social system in the atmosphere of democracy, 
its real content but not of a substitute with formal 
features. The forms of democracy, of course, can 
be different in different political systems based 
on historical and other traditions, but the content 
of democracy in its foundations and principles 
is one-dimensional. In this regard, we agree 
with E.G. Yassin that “managed democracy 
... means that in reality the state is subject to 
the bureaucracy ...”, which naturally limits the 
boundaries of democracy, negates the efforts to 
build a civil society. (Yasin, 2004. P.17). 
Democracy is not government of the 
people, if understand literally the content of this 
term. It just cannot be that people rule the state. 
“Democracy is a certain technology acquisition 
and implementation of a minority government 
with the help of majority, relying on majority, but 
not always in the interests and to the benefit of the 
majority”, writes A.D. Kerimov. (Kerimov, 2007, 
P.26). Democracy involves the creation of such an 
atmosphere in the community, under which even 
the most insignificant voice, opinion can not only 
be heard by the authorities but also taken into 
consideration.
Democracy in its full expression serves 
as an essential attribute of a successful organic 
socio-economic transformation, as it provides 
openness, transparency, respect for human rights 
and freedoms, equality of all citizens before the 
law. Democracy unleashes creative energy of 
the people guided to the track of creation of new 
social relations.
The Russian leadership of the early 
2000s had a difficult choice: to strengthen the 
democratic tendencies of the 1990s, fill them up 
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with real, concrete substance and by solving this 
problem to bring the socio-economic reforms to 
the needs of society; or to continue the Russian 
tradition of the feudal order of power for the 
power itself through manipulation of the law, 
upholding the interests of bureaucracy. Putting 
forward the thesis of “managed democracy” 
to stake on authoritarianism, concentration 
of state power beyond the democratic space. 
The second trend became dominant. Thus, the 
Russian state government continued to follow the 
Byzantine tradition rooted back to the medieval 
Russia, which consisted in the implementation 
of the thesis that the power in all its forms and 
manifestations is above the law.
A retreat from democratic principles of 
public management inevitably increased the level 
of lack of freedom in the society, closeness of 
the power to control of the citizens and criticism 
of the government. In the absence of alternative 
projects, concepts and opinions authoritarianism, 
political monopoly intensified, which 
significantly reduced the efficiency of conducted 
socio-economic transformation. The economic 
laws, under which the market develops and 
operates, were substituted with non-economic, 
administrative methods of management; there 
appeared signs of the administrative-command 
system incompatible with market reforms. The 
reforms themselves lost momentum, as they 
were based not on the objective reality but on the 
minds of government officials who provided and 
oversaw the reforms.
Interesting data, which indicated a lack 
of socio-political and economic experience of 
functioning of the Russian society in democracy, 
were received during a survey by VCIOM. 26 % 
of Russians believed that democracy was a 
“universal value”, 42 % thought democracy was 
“harmful to the state”. 44 % of respondents valued 
stability in the society most of all, while 37 % – 
the law (Kostikov, 2006, P.8). The movement of 
the Russian power in the direction of managed 
democracy under such circumstances was fully 
justified from the perspective of majority of the 
society.
At the initial stage of reforms the state 
reform could be considered a success. In this case, 
it was not about the effectiveness of government 
agencies. First of all, the strategic problem was 
solved of preventing the growth of centrifugal 
tendencies that led to the disintegration of a 
unified Russian state. Further, nomination and 
decision of a critical strategic political objective 
followed to achieve a higher degree of efficiency 
of government agencies at all levels within the 
framework of reforming the political system of 
society, development of public policy that can 
bring the country out of the social catastrophe, 
overcome the accumulated destructive tendencies 
in the society.
However, the first steps to strengthen the 
state were limited to external forms not leading to 
radical changes in the state’s role in the society that, 
in turn could lead to significant positive changes 
in the economy addressing the main strategic 
objective of improving the standard of living of 
the population. There still was no clear strategy 
of the state development, an integrated program 
of bringing the country out of the economic 
and social crisis. This applied to a scientifically 
developed theory for the transition period, a 
state stabilization program – a political strategy 
based on the actual socio-economic conditions 
of Russia’s revival. The exception in this respect 
was the fundamental scientific study “Economics 
of transition period: Essays on economic policy 
in post-communist Russia. 1991-1997” (Moscow: 
Institute for Economy in Transition, 1998), 
performed under the supervision of E.T. Gaidar.
The remaining reasonable, correct theses 
put forward by leaders of the state – the need 
to strengthen the family, the fight against child 
homelessness and neglect, the formation of 
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conditions for healthy living, the solution of 
pressing demographic problems, etc. – did not 
receive reinforcement from the organizational 
and financial point of view, sank down into 
talking by officials. It did not give any significant 
socio-economic effect in solution of problems put 
forward by the state leadership.
One of the ways of strengthening the state 
taken by Vladimir Putin was the introduction 
to the state structures of representatives of the 
uniformed services – the Army, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Federal Security Service 
(Arinin, 2012, P. 7-33). The idea was that the 
security forces will be able to restore order in 
the field, to strengthen discipline, to stabilize 
the socio-economic conditions for giving new 
impetus to the reforms. This was done through 
democratic means, through elections using 
the administrative resource by the candidates 
including support from the President himself.
In our opinion, it is impossible to assess this 
trend in political terms unambiguously. On the one 
hand, participation of representatives from law 
enforcement agencies in the structures of the state 
to some extent contributed to the strengthening of 
discipline, order, especially at the regional level. 
The siloviki were less involved into the games 
between local and central bureaucracies, less 
influenced by political parties and movements. 
On the other hand, representatives of law 
enforcement agencies did not have the appropriate 
managerial experience of regional management, 
which reduced the efficiency of their managing 
activities. The teams of engaged specialists were 
not always able to replace the first person. Some 
members of security departments promoted to 
the posts of regional managers could not resist the 
temptations of cooperation with business entities 
of a questionable character.
In December 2003, elections to the State 
Duma of the fourth convocation were held in 
Russia. Convincing victory in elections won 
the pro-presidential “United Russia”, which 
received more than 37 % of the vote. In support 
of the “United Russia” a powerful administrative 
resource was called, which included, inter alia, 
the support of President Vladimir Putin.
The second place was taken by the 
Communist Party with a considerable loss of its 
earlier positions in the Duma, receiving 12.7 % of 
the vote. The reasons for the loss of majority of 
the Communist Party electorate are multifaceted. 
Among them is the outflow of a part of votes to 
the patriotic block “Rodina” (Motherland), the 
information blockade in the media, errors in the 
pre-election program guidelines that had lost 
relevance and topical meaning.
The third position in the Duma, unexpectedly 
for the most of professional political consultants, 
was taken by the Liberal Democratic Party – 
11.6 %, which re-emerged from the political 
wilderness of the previous years. LDPR leader 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky was able to gather the 
protest electorate using well-defined slogans “We 
are for the poor, we are for the Russians” imbued 
with nationalistic spirit.
Unexpected results were shown by the 
fourth political force that entered the State 
Duma – the block “Motherland”, which within a 
short time gained a convincing victory due to the 
use of campaign slogans in support of the Russian 
people, the ideas of statehood and patriotism.
All of the political parties that entered the 
State Duma, with all existing political differences, 
were by content the parties, which to some extent 
defended the ideas of great power that became 
dominant for the Russian statehood.
Sensational was the crushing defeat at the 
Duma elections of the right-wing parties: SPS 
and the “Yabloko”, who could not overcome the 
5 percent barrier. With the defeat at the election 
the right-wing parties lost their influence on the 
policy line of the state. The main reason for the 
defeat of the right forces became the detachment 
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of their political programs from the realities of 
life, the immediate needs of citizens and the 
tiredness of the population of liberal reforms.
As a result of the elections to the Duma a 
pro-presidential majority was formed in the 
parliament consisting of deputies, supporters and 
members of the “United Russia”, which made 
“united Russians” responsible for the legislative 
policy of the State Duma. At the same time, the 
loss of the State Duma opposition sentiments 
in relation to the executive government and its 
political decisions had negative consequences 
in terms of the need to adjust the state policy 
reforms. In such circumstances, the state lost 
the variety of shades of political and ideological 
spectrum of opinions from different sectors of 
the society.
On March 14, 2004 the presidential election 
was convincingly won by the acting Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, who was elected to a 
second presidential term. He received 71,22 % 
of the vote. His political opponents, Nikolai 
Kharitonov of the Communist Party got – 13,74 %, 
Sergei Glazyev – 4,11 %, Irina Hakamada – 
3,85 %, Oleg Malyshkin from the Liberal 
Democratic Party – 2,03 %, Sergei Mironov of 
the Party of Life – 0,76 %. The overall attendance 
was 64,3 %. People who voted against all were 
3,46 % of all voters (Izvestia, 2004, 16 March).
In the Voronezh Region, at the presidential 
election of March 14, 2004 Putin received 
65,28 %, N. Kharitonov – 21,96 %, Glazyev – 
3,37 %, Hakamada – 2,93 %, against all – 2,67 %, 
O. Malyshkin – 2,21 %, S. Mironov – 0,87 %. 
The election was attended by 62,5 % of Voronezh 
voters (Izvestia, 2004, 16 March) 
The convincing victory of Vladimir Putin in 
the election indicated that the majority of voters 
continued to feed hopes for an adjustment of 
the political line, the vector of socio-economic 
reforms that could improve life of the working 
people of the Russian society. In addition, its 
role was played by the absence of major political 
blunders of the state leadership in the period of 
2000-2004. The global market situation was 
favorable too, which helped to replenish the state 
budget through exports of energy resources.
Putin’s election platform in 2004, like it 
was earlier, contained no specific promises; 
it was sufficiently vague and not adjacent to 
any of the ideological and party trends. This 
circumstance was an advantage as compared to 
other presidential candidates, whose ideological 
positions were closely tied to the political line of 
the specific parties and movements.
In this regard a substantial interest for this 
study is the issue of the nature of the Russian 
government at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. In the disclosure of its political content a 
response is rooted to the question of seriousness 
of the state to implement or continue the 
transformations that were begun. This contains 
the moral aspect of the problem and the question 
of the political role of its leaders.
It is traditionally believed that Putin and his 
entourage (although it is far from being uniform) 
express political interests of the center. A growing 
number of political parties, factions of the Duma 
gravitated to the political center. Political center 
provides the most stable position in the Russian 
society, the possibility of a political maneuver, 
finding compromises, overcoming conflicts, 
seeking for political allies, etc.
At the same time, the phenomenon of a 
political center is very complicated, multi-
dimensional, especially in the periods of 
transition. The ideological platform of the Russian 
state was depicted in a rather elaborate formula 
of “conservative-centrist liberalism”, which 
claimed to unite the largest possible number of 
people, supporters of the implementation of the 
reform course. This term appeared in a British 
newspaper “Financial Times” in the middle of 
January 2004 and belonged to the new head of 
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the Russian President Administration Dmitry 
Medvedev.
Dmitry Medvedev summed up the first 
presidential term of Vladimir Putin. The main 
outcome was the achievement of political stability, 
which at the State Duma elections in December 
2003 was legitimized by the Russian voters. This 
fact became very important to support the reform 
policy. The main direction of state policy of the 
Russian leader before the presidential elections 
in 2004 was identified by Dmitry Medvedev as 
creation of a competitive economy, new jobs, 
modernization of production facilities and 
reduction in poverty. These priorities formed 
the content of the conservative-centrist social-
economic program of the state management 
(Izvestia, 2004, 21 January).
During Vladimir Putin’s stay at the head 
of the state from March 2000 to March 2004, 
it became possible to stop gaining force of 
processes of the state degradation, destruction of 
law enforcement and other power agencies. The 
constitutional order was restored in the country; a 
new vertical of federal executive power was rebuilt. 
Trends appeared of constructive interaction 
between legislative and executive branches of 
government, the efficiency of legislative work of 
the Parliament improved. Common legal space 
of the country was restored. All these measures 
should be attributed to the absolute merits of the 
new Russian political elite.
However, the state leadership failed to fully 
remove the burden of accumulated political 
problems, to achieve more effective political 
decisions. One of the main reasons for this 
situation consisted of mixing phenomena in the 
analysis of causal links and relationships, when 
instead of the necessity to establish the cause 
and resolve conflicts arising in practice, the 
state struggled with resulting factors that were 
often of the second but not first order. Therefore, 
the structures of the state lacked an effective 
mechanism for resolving socio-economic 
contradictions in the implementation of the state 
reform policy. Thus, in response to the call of 
the President of Russia to fight against one of the 
glaring negative manifestations of public life – 
juvenile neglect and homelessness – Deputy 
Prime Minister Valentina Matvienko said that 
she personally would ride on the Moscow train 
stations and collect homeless children. But what 
to do next with these children? Deliver them to 
orphanages? This statement is a clear example 
of substitution of reasons with a result. Such 
examples are plentiful. In such approaches the 
problem, of course, could not be resolved. The 
matter is not in the number of open children’s 
homes and strengthening of Russian family but 
in the organization of effective family support 
from the state. In this respect very little was 
done.
Resume: The terrible tragedy in Beslan in 
September 2004, which killed more than three 
hundred people – adults and children, became a 
watershed in the politics of Vladimir Putin, who 
took the course of strengthening the power vertical 
and gradual phasing out democratic processes in 
the country. In September 2004, gubernatorial 
elections were canceled. V.B. Pastukhov rightly 
believes that the changes in the political sphere 
since 2004 were associated not with the events 
in Beslan (they were just a cause) but with the 
“orange revolution” in Ukraine (Pastuhov, 2010, 
P.13). He calls a revision of democracy of the 
1990s “counter-revolutionary coup d’etat”, which 
led to the fact that real competition disappeared 
from the political life and the political system 
itself became closed. As a reaction of the power 
to the “orange revolution” in Kiev, the doctrine 
of “sovereign democracy” emerged primarily 
intended for external use only. In the same vein, 
V.B. Pastukhov considered the establishment of 
pro-Kremlin youth groups such as “Ours”, etc. to 
control the moods of the Russian youth.
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In line with the problems of Russian reforms 
of the 2000s a question of the nature of the 
Russian state and the Russian national idea is 
justified. For the first time in the modern Russian 
history, this question was put forward by the 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin right after the 
1996 presidential election. This thesis came out of 
the mouth of Boris Yeltsin, who was far from the 
national nature of the Russian government, quite 
unexpectedly and since then has been continually 
put forward in political debates by many experts – 
politicians, scientists, public figures. However, 
no significant positive solution to the complex 
ideological issues was achieved in the debates: the 
leaders either ignored the issue as unnecessary 
or brushed it aside as being unimportant. The 
issue of the national idea has not been raised into 
practice, which is quite surprising for a country 
that is a home to more than 160 different national 
groups.
However, the lack of a deep theoretical 
development of the problem, and all the more of a 
practical solution to the problem, creates difficulties 
for the efficient and effective national policy. 
Unresolved issues of the nationwide ideology 
create many difficulties and conflicts in the Russian 
society, hinder the reform political line.
The analysis of discussions around the topic 
of the all-Russian ideology has led us to the 
conclusion that this ideology must be based on 
historical and cultural traditions of the Russian 
people as a historically cementing ethnic group, 
around which other nations have been uniting for 
centuries, and the Russian state itself, Russia’s 
moral and spiritual space were formed. The 
structure of the all-Russian ideology must include 
the appropriate spiritual and moral elements of 
the lifestyle and mentality of other peoples of 
Russia in the form of national ideas, traditions, 
customs, and ceremonies.
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В данной статье рассматривается историческая эволюция реформ в России, их 
социополитическое обеспечение, описывается специфика проведения реформ в России, 
выявляются внутренние и внешние факторы, влияющие на характер преобразований.
Ключевые слова: реформы, социальные и политические преобразования, ход политических 
реформ, Россия и страны Запада, модель обгоняющего развития.
